Postsecularity and Political Protest
This paper examines and critically interprets the interrelations between religion and the Occupy movements of 2011. The Occupy movements have been recognised (see, for example, Smaligo 2014) as a coming together of radical currents of political activism in a series of local public assemblies to e pe i e t ith a p efigu ati e politi s that opposes the glo alised po e of the % o e the ultitude Ha dt a d Neg i a d ha pio s e o o i de o a a d so ial li e atio .
Although Occupy has subsequently been recognised as more of a o e t tha a o e e t Calhou , e a gue that it e ai s sig ifi a t as a i di atio of a ide p og essi e politi al movement that is still emerging. As active participants in Occupy Exeter (Williams) and Glasgow (Sutherland), and as resear he s ith spe ifi i te ests i politi all p og essi e espo ses to so ial welfare cuts and neoliberal austerity more generally (Cloke, Sutherland, Williams) , our own interest as oadl i spi ed O up s a ti-capitalist and pro-democratic aims. Howeve , efle tio o the horizontal and pluralistic character of Occupy and other social movements (Pickerill and Krinsky2012; Routledge 2003) soon led us to question the incorporation of religious people, organisations, spaces, rituals and symbols into the everyday practices and events of Occupy, and the ways in which Occupy offered hospitality and acceptance to progressive religious people and ideas. Drawing on extensive documentary evidence i we suggest that through these interconnections and involvements, a set of mutual challenges occurred: Occupy mounted a significant challenge to key aspects of established religion; and in turn some of the theological and ethical principles of religious participants, along with more general forms of religious imagery, symbolism and discourse, helped to shape Occupy. In view of the mutuality of this shaping-and-being-shaped, we argue that Occupy represents a series of eventspaces that can usefully be understood in terms of the emergence of postsecularity, co-constructed as mutual tolerance, crossover narratives and forms of partnership and rapprochement in praxis.
Recent theorisation of emergent geographies of postsecularity (see, for example, Beaumont and Baker 2011; Cloke and Beaumont 2012; Williams 2014) suggests the possibility of new forms of partnership between the religious and the secular. These geographies have been recognised principally in social and political contexts in Europe and America where Christianity has been the dominant religion, although ideas of postsecularity may also provide some analytical purchase on other dimensions of religious and multi-faith activity in the public sphere. If secularity has been broadly understood as the separation of religion from public and political spaces and concerns (albeit in various complex formssee Ta lo , postse ula it suggests, i Ede s te s, that eligio has fou d its pu li oi e agai , a d has egu to f e ue t the pu li sphe e aki g o fide t a d ultifa eted contributions to public affairs. Although these processes vary geographically (see Berger et al. 2008) ,
it a e suggested that so e eligious g oups a ha e a i easi gl sig ifi a t ole to pla i hat
Routledge (2003)-follo i g Ha e s o k o ilita t pa ti ula is -has termed
o e ge e spa es i hi h a di e sit of so ial o e e ts asso iate to e gage i dis u si e articulations of resistance.
These ideas about postsecularity have been problematized by a range of commentators. Aside from arguments that postsecular frameworks lack relevance and innovation (Kong 2010; Ley 2011) , present a short-sighted view of history and secularity (Beckford 2012; Wilford 2010) and reify the role of religion (Dalferth 2010) , attempts to investigate the postsecularity evident in particular events and spaces have been seen as the product of acritical naiveté (Lancione 2014) . However, an alternative and more positive grammar of interpretation has emerged in recent research in human geography that has pointed to some significant and perhaps fresh expressions of partnership between faithmotivated and other people, both in the embodied living out of religion (Olson et al. 2013) , and in the emergent subjectivities and spaces of third sector activity, often prompted by the neoliberal shrinkage of the formal state, and subsequent forms of engagement with, or resistance to, regimes of austerity welfare (Beaumont and Baker 2011; Beaumont and Cloke 2012; Cloke 2010; Cloke et al. 2010 Cloke et al. , 2013 Jamoul and Wills 2008; Williams 2014; Williams et al. 2012) . The distinctiveness of these emergent partnerships is not connected to any grand claims about an epochal postsecular era or a totalising postsecular city. Rather, such partnerships are significant because they exhibit some of the key discursive technologies presented by Habermas (2002 Habermas ( , 2005 Habermas ( , 2006 Habermas ( , 2010 Habermas and Ratzinger 2006) through which postsecularity might be discerned (Cloke 2015; Cloke and Beaumont 2012) . In particular, Habermas points to a learning process in which secular and religious mentalities can be reflexively transformed rather than maintained in dominant and subaltern positions respectively.
Although the divide between secular knowledge and revealed religious knowledge cannot be bridged entirely, Habermas envisages both a framework of mutual tolerance as the foundation for emerging postsecular rapprochement, and the possibility of distinct crossover narratives between the religious and the secular that serve as mutually translating technologies on which to found the assimilation necessary for such rapprochement.
Although O up ep ese ts a highl sig ifi a t se ies of e e t-spaces in its own right, we suggest that it p o ides a sig ifi a t oppo tu it oth to e a i e e e ge t postse ula it i politi al p otest, a d o e ge e all to e o figu e the hegemonic grammars by which relations between politics and religion are typically understood. Political economic analyses of contemporary globalisation and governance tend to associate religious belief, ritual and institutions as natural collaborators in the promulgation of the logics, spatialities and subjectivities of neoconservativism and neoliberalism (see, for example, Dittmer and Sturm 2010; Goode 2006; Hackworth2012; Jordan 2010; Sturm 2013) .
Drawing on imaginaries that are disproportionately fuelled by the strange and widely mediated antics of Tea Pa t 'epu li a is i the U" 'ose thal ; "ko pol a d Willia so , so e politi al geographers seem prone to assume that the role of religion in Western Europe and America is to shore up and inspire the political right as part of the Evangelical-Capitalist resonance machine(Connolly , a d thus to se e as sig ifi a t little platoo s that si pl pe fo the i he e tl p o le ati duties of neoliberal revanchism and global injustice (Peck and Tickell 2002; Smith 1996) . The criticality of such assumptions is beginning to be questioned in recent accounts of the relationships between religion, spirituality and political activism (see, for example, Cloke 2011; Dylan and Coates 2012; Habashi 2013; Hutchison 2012; Sheridan 2012 ) on at least two grounds.
First, it appears that institutional memory has quickly overlooked the key involvements of religion in particular political protests of the past. For example, Semmel (1974) has recorded the religious impact of 19th century Methodism on the emerging Labour movement in the UK, including reforming legislation, the growth of trades unions and the cooperative movement, and the foundation of the Labour Party itself (see Scotland 1997) . The history of the UK peace movement is also tangled up with religious participation and contribution, with, for example, the Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament representing an influential formal and informal source of theo-philosophy and activism in the wider CND movement to the present day (Flessati 1997) . Further afield, religious groups have been credited with significant involvement in international geographies of peace and reconciliation (Megoran 2010; Megoran et al. 2013) . Perhaps the most important social protest movement of the Second, there is compelling contemporary evidence that religious articulation of morality and politics continues to be an explicit contributor to social movements, ranging from the initial postsecular character of the so-called Arab Spring (see Barbato 2012; Dabashi 2012; Mavelli 2012) interpretative logic would suggest that these interventions potentially represent a resistance to the politics of the status quo (see Williams et al. 2012) . And often dismissed as merely charitable or caring so as to moralise the self (see Allahyari 2000) , there is more than a shrewd interpretative suspicion that the phenomenology of this care is integrally intertwined with the rising up of political protest in ways that draw religious charity and compassion directly into progressively politicised fields of policy concern (May and Cloke 2014) .
Religion, then, continues to bring theological and activist contributions to contemporary social movements. Naturally such contributions will vary widely (Megoran et al. 2013) , ranging from politics of the common good (Bretherton 2010) also find aspects of religion and faith to be politically inspiring for left-leaning social mobilisation (Cloke and Beaumont 2012) . More generally, it would seem that citizens are more prepared to accept religious traditions as relevant provided that they are not accompanied by the establishment of a dominant religious creed or civil religion. These conditions of potential postsecularity are formed from at least two major transformations: the rediscovery of prophetic religious praxis (Bartholomew and Goheen 2006; Bell 2006; Wright 2011 ) that in turn opens out a wider willingness to participate beyond religious circles; and the shift in traditional labour and social movements towards more loosely connected and horizontal forms of organising (Graeber 2013). It is these conditions that have opened up the possibility in Occupy for a further reinvigoration of historical political radicalism on the part of religious groups within a postsecular social movement. In this way the specific eventspaces of Occupy are also illustrative of the wider postsecular configuration of religion and political protest, and as such provide both specific and wider contextual evidence for understanding the contemporary relations between religion and political protest.
We develop these ideas through three interrelated discussions. . In this way, the church represents both an institution and a series of communities, variously challenging and being challenged by Occupy. Third, therefore, we consider the effect and challenges posed by religious groups on Occupy. We conclude by arguing that more careful attention is needed to the progressive potential brought about through the blurring of religious and secular boundaries at work in contemporary protest movements, suggesting that emergent postsecularity provides an analytical frame through which to analyse the ethical and spiritual geographies of political acquiescence and resistance.
Religion and the Occupy Movement
Although the Occupy Movement of 2011 appears to have been founded on nonreligious foundations and motivations (inspired as it was by solidarity with the Arab Spring, with broad-based protests in By reframing unrelenting consumerism in the language of idolatry, an ideological critique of capitalist political-economy became translated into moral and ethical registers of the self. Many of these images went viral on the internet and in mainstream media reporting. In each of these cases, religious narrative and famous religious discourses were used by the movement to help illustrate more wideranging arguments and at the same time pose questions for the institutional church. In another example, OWS protestors set up an Occupy Nativity scene iv in front of Trinity Church, in an attempt to convince the church to start acting less like a real estate corporation and more like a church, and to let the movement use a vacant property that Trinity owns (Schneider 2012 
Occupy London Stock Exchange (OLSX)
On 15 October 2011, as part of an international day of solidarity with OWS, 2500-3000 people gathered outside London Stock Exchange. As police swiftly moved protestors away from the site, a camp was set up next to St Paul s Cathedral, and by occupying physical religious space, Occupy LSX and others opened up a series of discursive spaces for people of faith who identify with leftist politics to enter. What resulted was a postsecular event-space, similar to that of OWS, characterised by the crossing-over of religious and secular narratives. Early on in the occupation, Occupy Faith was set up as a broad-based affinity group within the Occupy Movement seeking to connect the values of faith communities with those of other spiritual and political faiths in order to work towards common issues of social, economic and environmental justice (Occupy Faith 2012) . Given both the mutuality of purpose that quickly diffused throughout the Occupy movement, and the highly mediated nature of Amos, go, flee away to the land of Judah … and prophesy there; but never again prophesy at Bethel, for it is the king s sanctuary, and it is a temple of the kingdom (see Amos 7:10-17).
Right there we see the intertwining of religion and state power that chokes off religion s ability to challenge economic, cultural and political structures that reserve power to elites and oppress the rest of the population, especially the poor.
In these ways, religious ritual and meditation on scripture became part of a discursive galvanising of Occupy campaigners stated:
rather than inviting us to a debate on Sunday, why not come to this already organised event.
Rather than inviting Occupy London and its supporters to a panel from across the political and business spectrum … [to which you] … invite the protesters to be represented we urge you come and meet some people in a non-hierarchical forum-where no one person s view is privileged over another s (Occupy London 2011) .
During the event, arguments about idolatry were repeatedly rehearsed in an attempt to redefine not The Christian movement has been around for 2,000 years-so that s a lot of time in which to get co-opted. We had a pretty good run for the first 300 years, before the Roman Emperor Constantine legalised us, patronised us and co-opted us. Radical Christianity had, and has, an anarchist orientation towards power and a pacifist orientation towards violence. Jesus has no truck with violence and exploitation (Ciaron O Reilly, London Catholic Worker, quoted in IndyMediaUK 2011).
The emergent publics (Barnett 2008 ) generated in this protest enabled postsecular spaces of reflexive engagement to be forged through which participants assessed how to remake the world in a way that can accommodate the ethical desires of both religiously and secularly self-identifying citizens.
Consequently, religious and secular discourses crossed over from one to the other in order to ask the questions of powerful institutions (banks, governments, churches) necessary for advancing the goals of the movement. These practices included use of Biblical texts and narratives by those of no religious persuasion in pursuit of highlighting contradictions in the hegemony.
The Challenge from Occupy to the Church
In the remainder of this paper we examine two sets of challenges that emerged from relations Sennett (2012) reminds us that the Occupy movements have dramatized debates about public space, and one of the key dramas involved different faith-based models of how space should be sacralised.
The preservation of a within-these-walls approach to sacred Christianity was directly challenged during Occupy, not so much in a religious-versus-secular engagement but by the enfolding of radically different Christian faith discernments and practices into protests that challenged public/private and secular/sacred spatial distinctions and rendered them ambiguous and hybrid. The discursive siloing of faith within church buildings represented a religion that was synonymous with the powers and subjectivities authorised by global capitalism-the heresy of seeing oneself as isolated, insulated, and individual. This stereotype of the silo is uncritical, given the burgeoning concern within a wide range of Christian thinking to connect faith to social action against injustice (see, for example, Cloke et al. Townsend 2011) . In so doing they pointed to the sanctity of the camp as opposed to that of the cathedral, invoking a Jesus-figure who dwelt in everyday places of need, who critiqued the religious institutions and practices of his time, and is more easily imagined and understood in the context of a protest camp than in an establishment temple (Lane 2002) . This contrast between privileged templeworship and engagement in a postsecular shared-space represents a very significant challenge posed by Occupy to the Christian church. Indeed, it can be argued that Occupy s challenge to hierarchical, undemocratic, even authoritarian tendencies that prevail in some modern churches today (Fox 2006) constitutes a movement that seeks to reawaken a spiritual democracy that is deeply ecumenical and re-enchants material quest for justice with the theo-poetics of love (Bucko and Fox 2013) . and to dance on injustice. Rieger and Pui-lan (2012) argue that images of God as omnipotent and immutable too easily fuel an identification of God with dominant powers, and that these top-down theologies have been directly promoted by a self-interested 1% through the ages. The challenge from
Occupy is to rethink divine power from the bottom up, through the incarnational narrative of Jesus, the provincial carpenter s son whose humanity and divinity entered into solidarity with the multitude and whose on-the-ground kingdom involved good news for the poor, freedom from oppression and release for captives. In so doing, people of faith can join with others to reject both political oppression and falsely theistic theology that upholds those oppressions through models of dominant power;
joining postsecular forces to identify and live out mutual principles (see Cloke and Beaumont 2012) that permit rapprochement between faith and no-faith around politics and ethics that oppose injustice and oppression.
This theological reorientation towards a God of the multitude presents parallel challenges in terms of identifying possibilities for a theology of the church of the multitude . Graeber s (2013) The theology of a church of the multitude will inevitably include a return to the principles of the decentralised, counter-cultural and international early church, that, as Barrett and Haag (2012) explain, promoted forgiveness of debts, interest-free lending, mutual support and common ownership-an ekklesia of people in community wanting to influence corporate lives for good. ix Here, the Occupy movement yet again provides many potential parallels with the early church; Bloomquist The second element to the challenge is prophetic purposefulness (Brueggemann 2007a) . The call to the Christian church is to address the theological crisis of faith and hope; to name and speak truth to powers and to move into spaces that subvert those powers. Worship of the gods of materiality represented by structural greed, and carrying an unquestioning faith in the gods of absolute economic and political ideology are matters of spiritual idolatry requiring purposeful prophetic action. The church needs to open up its sanctified spaces to forward-looking conversations that expose the idolworship of success, consumerism and prosperity blessing, and that propose self-emptying practices of embrace, companionship, solidarity, caritas and agape. And as Laarman (2011) The triple challenges presented to the church by the Occupy movement-moving out of sacred silospaces, rediscovering the ekklesia of the multitude and taking action shaped by discursive remembering and prophetic purposefulness-each suggest moves towards the emergence of postsecular spaces of partnership and rapprochement (Cloke and Beaumont 2012) . Moving out of silospaces into more hybrid or even ambiguous spaces permits a theology of incarnational praxis to develop in amongst the multitude, which in turn prompts an enactment of subversive and prophetic solidarity with those who are oppressed and marginalised. Although Occupy is by no means a churchled movement, it demonstrates the potential for what Habermas (2010) has termed crossover narratives between secular and religious parties seeking more progressive expressions and actions.
Such partnerships are inevitably political as well as ethical, and as such have the capacity in return to help challenge the emerging nature and direction of progressive movements such as Occupy.
The Challenge from the Church to Occupy
Just as the Occupy movement held a mirror up to the church, so, we would argue, the incorporation of religious motivation, discourse and symbolism helped to coproduce the cultural politics of Occupy. [t]he spirituality of the Occupy movement is not one that references God, the Divine, or even the numinous, but instead is found in the imaginative transcendence of the consumerist, individualistic, hierarchical constructions of the self and society that we in America are spoonfed from birth.
The notion of temporally autonomous zones has been widely used (see, for example, Bretherton 2011), to conceptualise the significance of Occupy as a temporary wrong-footing (rather than total secession from) market state logics and norms, and as a space where subjects-with the will and/or ability to slip the grip of capital discipline-could participate in direct democratic processes. Much attention has been given to the material and discursive dimensions of this autonomous politics.
However, we argue that Occupy should also be understood to have carved out a spiritual autonomous zone-not exclusively in the sense that religious voices and actors were tolerated and welcomed, although this was part of it, but rather because the practices of Occupy centred on naming and discerning the co-option and satiation of the human spirit against the trappings of late capitalism.
There has been much recent interest in these affective and spiritual aspects of neoliberalism (Jensen 2011; Vrasti 2009; Ward 2009) , recognising the importance of the affective register as a site of capitalist inscription-working through the freedoms, emotions, affective labour (having the right attitude )-and establishing the possibilities through which we narrate our relation to life itself. As
Derrick Jensen (2006:552) explains:
It would be a mistake to think this culture clearcuts only forests. It clearcuts our psyche as well. It would be a mistake to think it dams only rivers. We ourselves are dammed (and damned) by it as well. It would be a mistake to think it creates dead zones only in the ocean.
It creates dead zones in our hearts and minds. It would be a mistake to think it fragments only habitat. We, too, are fragmented, split off, shredded, rent, torn.
And [w]hen these territories of desire and imagination are stolen, ravaged, and toxified it becomes that much easier for the theft and destruction of natural landscapes to go uncontested, unnoticed (Jensen 2011) .
Tim Jensen (2011) argues that the hegemony of neoliberalism is not simply maintained through a common economic logic, but also through a common sensorium that trains us to experience certain emotions over others, suggests rules for their expression, and even tries to define what one is allowed to feel for. These everyday flows of affective and emotional feeling habituate us to the cadence of neoliberal subjectivity, but can in turn prompt a hopeless vacuity, as the new weak mysticism of the age becomes characterized by endless self-serving acts of negation and denial … [and a] dreary acceptance in some quarters that how we live is circumscribed by the marketstate s ability to shape how we govern ourselves (Philip Blond, quoted in Cloke and Beaumont 2012:13) . Critchley (2012) and Ward (2009) talk of the paralysis of empty nihilism associated with the contemporary political-economic predicament, whose only discernible telos is the individual pursuit of pleasure.
However, postsecular styled practices of going-beyond-the-self co-constituted in part by theo-ethical notions of the incarnation (Thomas 2012) provide a counter-cultural ethic that confronts, and secedes from, the widely hegemonic priorities of wealth, individual gain and pleasure. This creates a context in which alternative futures can be imagined (Brueggemann 1978) , encouraging the creation of new ways of living that expand in the cracks of capitalism bringing hope and healing alongside a rigorous critique of the status quo. Perhaps the most significant challenge from the church to Occupy is to insist that it is not just a material life that needs to be reclaimed from the neoliberal paradigm, but affective psycho-spiritual life as well.
Conclusion
This paper has suggested new ways of exploring the relationship between religion and contemporary activism. We argue that dominant typologies developed in the 20th century to describe the different ways churches, or religions more broadly, relate to society may have become somewhat outdated.
Instead, our interpretation of the relationship between Occupy and religion suggests the need for new grammars that can attend to the increasing blurring of religious and secular ethics in contemporary social life. Through an illustration of OWS and OLSX, we contend that religious actors, discourses, and practices that played a significant role in co-constituting the ethos of the Occupy Movement. Our aim here is not simply to affirm that the relations between capitalism, religion and spirituality are paradoxical and contested, and as such should not be conflated to a narrow discussion of religioideological neo-conservativism in the USA and elsewhere. Rather we suggest, following Habermas As such, Occupy addressed a crisis of secular consciousness which is marked by an increasing fragmentation of values and an underlying incapacity, or lack of belief, in addressing pressing ethical and political questions. However, it can also be conceptualised as a spiritual disobedience-opting out of the satiation of imperial religion, with its domestications; and experiencing a temporary autonomous space where existing hierarchies, dispositions, and deeply held beliefs can be reworked.
During the Sermon on the Steps, Ciaron O Reilly of London Catholic Worker articulated the spiritual aspect of activism by contrasting it with the passive neoliberal subject-citizen:
Why those in power find this encampment, your presence, so abhorrent is that you are exercising active citizenship, not playing your designated role as passive consumers in this Square Mile. A Shock Doctrine place that has historically been cleared of residents and citizenship. Those in power don t want you to be active citizens, they want you to be passive consumers. They want you to think that the only freedom you have is at the point of consumption. The freedom to choose between Coke and Pepsi, Nike and Reebok … Don t entertain the thought that you have any freedom at work or in your community or on your campus. They don t even want your active support for their wars any more. All they want is your silence and sedation, your resignation. This camp is a movement of a holy spirit at the centre of empire against the spirits of resignation, cynicism that facilitate war and global exploitation (quoted in IndyMediaUK 2011).
So much work that has focused on the territories of the Occupy movement (Halvorsen 2012) has neglected these realms of the spiritual and the invisible terrains of activism. We suggest that Occupy needs to be understood at least in part as a deeply spiritual and sacramental protest, not solely in its aims and objectives, but in its practices, its hospitality to otherness, and its offer of direct experience of mutualism and radical democratic forms of organising. The solidarity practices within encampments offered a deeply spiritual counter-formation to the affective repercussions of capitalist liturgies (or discourses) that saturate our everyday lives. Counter-neoliberal liturgies that enforce an alternative spiritual and ethical worldview to the neoliberal entreaty to consume, behave and be comfortable can be a pragmatically meditative resource for producing a hopeful subjectivity, that operates beyond a symbolic understanding or attachment to the capitalist order, recognising its perversity, and more able to imagine and embody prefigurative possibilities for living.
From our own reflections, these spiritual liturgies had a temporality that existed inside and outside the camp, which can be best summarised in the words of Butler et al. (2011) : 2015) . viii Ekklesia is a think tank and news service that seeks to bring Christian theology into politics and public life. ix The Greek word ekklesia is often translated in the New Testament as church , but more properly refers to a local congregation or assembly meeting together for a common purpose.
x Pickerill and Krinsky (2013:282) rightly warn against any over-romanticisation of the consensus decisionmaking process, and highlight the gendered and racialised exclusions active in the Occupy movement.
